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ABSTRACT
The Dunning-Kruger Effect is a metacognitive phenomenon in which
individuals who perform poorly on a task believe they performed well, whereas
individuals who performed very well believe their performance was only average.
To date, this effect has only been investigated in the context of performance on
mathematical, logical, or lexical tasks, but has yet to be explored for its
generalizability in episodic memory task performance. We used a novel method
to elicit the Dunning-Kruger Effect via a memory test of item and source
recognition confidence. Participants studied 4 lists of words and were asked to
make a simple decision about the words (source memory, i.e. Is it manmade? Is
it alive?). They were later tested on their episodic memory and source memory
for the words using a five-point recognition confidence scale, while
electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded. After the test, participants were
asked to estimate the percentile in which they performed compared to other
students. Participants were separated into four quartiles based on their
performance accuracy. Results showed that participants in all four groups
estimated the same percentile for their performance. Participants in the bottom
25th percentile overestimated their percentile the most, while participants in the
top 75th percentile slightly under-estimated their percentile, exhibiting the DKE
and extending its phenomenon into studies of episodic memory. Groups were
then re-categorized into participants that over-estimated, correctly estimated, and
under-estimated their percentile estimate. Over-estimators responded
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significantly faster than under-estimators when estimating themselves as in the
top percentile and they responded slower when evaluating themselves as in the
bottom percentile. EEG first revealed generic scalp-wide differences withinsubjects for all memory judgments as compared to all self-estimates of
metacognition, indicating an effective sensitivity to task differences. More specific
differences in late parietal sites were evident between high percentile estimates
and low percentile estimates. Between-group differences were evident between
over-estimators and under-estimators when collapsing across all Dunning-Kruger
responses, which revealed a larger late parietal component (LPC) associated
with recollection-based processing in under-estimators compared to those of
over-estimators when assessing their memory judgements. These findings
suggest that over- and under-estimators use differing cognitive strategies when
assessing their performance and that under-estimators use less recollection
when remembering episodic items, thereby revealing that episodic memory
processes are playing a contributory role in the metacognitive judgments of
illusory superiority that are characterized by the Dunning-Kruger Effect.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Several influential individuals should be acknowledged for their hard work
and dedication on this thesis. I would like to thank my thesis committee for their
impactful feedback and contributions to this project: Dr. Donna Garcia, Dr. John
Clapper, and Dr. Richard Addante: Their guidance was crucial to my success.
I would also like to thank everyone in the CSUSB Cognitive Neuroscience
Lab who helped collect EEG data, clean the equipment, and analyze the data:
Lindsey Sirianni, Rose De Kock, Celene Gonzalez, Yoselin Canizalez, Roman
Lopez, Constance Greenwood, Raechel Marino, Maynori Hinton, Kevin Benitez,
Fitria Jong Martinez, Alex Burton, and Vanessa Garcia. Lindsey Sirianni
deserves an extra special thank you for being the driving force behind much of
the programming for all the experiments in the lab. We used her programming
knowledge to learn how to code and adapt the code for each of our projects
The Office of Student Research, Office of Graduate Studies, and ASI at
CSUSB have all generously contributed to supporting this project; their funding to
conduct research, travel to conferences, and develop my presentation skills with
this research is very much appreciated.
My family also deserves huge acknowledgement. Thank you to Emmanuel
Chue, Deborah Hashimoto, Mike Muller, Cameron Yang, Lisa Muller, Mitsuko
Nagaishi, Robert Nagaishi, and Gene Hashimoto for always being supportive of
my academic pursuits and for instilling in me a love of learning.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................................................................... v
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................... viii
LIST OF FIGURES ...............................................................................................ix
CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REIVIEW
Background................................................................................................ 1
The Dunning-Kruger Effect ........................................................................ 5
Variations to the Classic Dunning-Kruger Effect Paradigm ............. 8
Theoretical Accounts and Models of the Dunning-Kruger Effect ... 10
Memory Research ................................................................................... 12
Memory Confidence and Accuracy ............................................... 12
Memory Confidence and Familiarity .............................................. 14
Familiarity and Recollection .......................................................... 15
Metacognition and Metamemory .............................................................. 16
Physiological Measurements of Metacognition ............................. 20
A Memory-Based Framework for the Dunning-Kruger Effect ................... 22
Addressing the Gap in the Current Literature .......................................... 25
Current Study........................................................................................... 26
CHAPTER TWO: METHOD
Participants .............................................................................................. 28
Memory Test Paradigm............................................................................ 29
Behavioral and Electrophysiological Measurements ................................ 29

vi

Procedure ................................................................................................ 32
Dunning-Kruger Post-Test Questions ...................................................... 37
Hypotheses .............................................................................................. 39
CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS
Behavioral Results ................................................................................... 41
Episodic Memory........................................................................... 41
Response Speeds for Episodic Memory Judgments ..................... 44
Dunning-Kruger Response Judgments ......................................... 46
Response Speeds for Dunning-Kruger Judgments ....................... 51
Electrophysiological Results .................................................................... 55
Recognition Memory ..................................................................... 55
Source Memory ............................................................................. 58
Dunning-Kruger Effect................................................................... 61
CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION
Recognition and Source Memory Results ................................................ 69
The Dunning-Kruger Effect ...................................................................... 71
Dunning-Kruger Behavioral Results .............................................. 71
Dunning-Kruger Physiology .......................................................... 74
Implications ................................................................................... 76
Limitations and Considerations for Future Research .................... 78
Summary and Conclusions ........................................................... 80
APPENDIX A: INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD ............................................ 83
REFERENCES ................................................................................................... 85

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Distribution of Responses for Each Item Response
as a Proportion of All Memory Responses .................................... 41
Table 2. Distribution of Responses for Each Source Response
as a Proportion of all Memory Responses .................................... 42
Table 3. Average Reaction Times for Each Item Memory Response ........... 44
Table 4. Average Reaction Times for Each Source Memory Response ....... 45
Table 5. Distribution of Responses for Each Dunning-Kruger
Response, as a Proportion of All Dunning-Kruger Responses ..... 47
Table 6. Average Recognition Memory Test Accuracy
and Average Post-Test and In-Test Dunning-Kruger
Relative Response by Quartile ..................................................... 48
Table 7. Response Distribution Proportions of Dunning-Kruger
Responses and Mean Reaction Times, Standard
Deviations, and Sample Size for In-Test Dunning-Kruger
Judgments by Estimator Group ..................................................... 54

viii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Encoding Paradigm ...................................................................... 33
Figure 2. Retrieval Paradigm ....................................................................... 36
Figure 3. Post-Test Dunning-Kruger Questions ............................................ 38
Figure 4. Response Times for Item Recognition Judgments for
Specific Item and Source Memory Conditions .............................. 46
Figure 5. Actual Percentile and Estimated Percentile by Quartile................. 47
Figure 6. Average Difference Score by Quartile ........................................... 49
Figure 7. Mean Reaction Times of High and Low Percentile
Estimation by Dunning-Kruger Groups ......................................... 53
Figure 8. Event-Related Potentials for Recognition Memory ........................ 56
Figure 9. Event-Related Potentials for High Confidence Recognition
and Low Confidence Recognition .................................................. 57
Figure 10. Event-Related Potentials for Source Memory.............................. 59
Figure 11. Event-Related Potentials for Contextual Familiarity .................... 61
Figure 12. Comparison of Event-Related Potentials for Memory
Judgments and Metacognitive Judgments Estimating
Performance ............................................................................... 62
Figure 13. Difference Waves of Recognition Memory Event-Related
Potential Effects for Dunning-Kruger Groups .............................. 64
Figure 14. Event-Related Potentials Comparing High and Low
Dunning-Kruger Self-Estimates ................................................. 66
Figure 15. Event-Related Potentials of Collapsed Dunning-Kruger
Responses by Dunning-Kruger Group ........................................ 68

ix

CHAPTER ONE
LITERATURE REVIEW

“…it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he thinks he knows
something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I think I
know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I
know what I do not know.”
– Socrates from Apology by Plato, 21d

Background
Everyone has their respective strengths and weaknesses, and even the
most competent expert on a given task is a relative novice on another. One’s
expertise is largely based upon experience and training but generalizing
experiences to unfamiliar tasks can elicit overconfidence on one’s performance.
Overconfidence in one’s skills is a common phenomenon that can happen to
anyone in varying situations and can lead to an array of problems.
Overconfidence has been a topic of interest throughout recorded history
as early as the time of Confucius, who said, “When you know a thing, to hold that
you know it; and when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it; this is knowledge.” (Confucius, trans. 1938/500). Since then, other prominent
figures in history such as Shakespeare have also identified this metacognitive
illusion of overconfidence (“The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man
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knows himself to be a fool”) (Shakespeare, 1998/1601, 5.1.2217-2219), and
Charles Darwin noted that “Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than
does knowledge” (Darwin, 2009/1871). Believing oneself to possess skills or
performance that one does not have is the essence of the illusory superiority
bias. A corollary implied by these observations is that metacognitive illusions are
bi-directional, such that more situationally-competent individuals tend to also be
under-confident in estimating their respective abilities or performance.
Metacognitive illusions of both overconfidence and under-confidence will be
examined in the current proposal.
The consequences of exhibiting overconfidence can range from
inconsequential to disastrous. Occasionally, overconfidence can be relatively
harmless (though perhaps at times embarrassing), such as discovering a
teammate’s lack of competence in a group project and helping them finish the
work together. At other times, the consequences are devastating, such as the
sinking of the Titanic. Many factors contributed to this tragic event, but a
significant factor was the overconfidence of the Titanic’s manufacturers and
captain that the ship was practically unsinkable; this overconfidence led down a
path claiming over 1500 lives (Bartlett, 2012; Lord, 1955; Lord, 1986). Although
dire consequences of overconfidence may not occur frequently, being
overconfident in one’s abilities is a cognition experienced by all people at one
time or another, and it is wise to minimize such illusions. It is, therefore, important
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to understand both how these judgments of overconfidence occur and why they
occur, so that strategies can be devised to help overcome them.
Empirical studies about overconfidence have been conducted for
decades. One of the earliest studies of overconfidence was conducted by
(Adams & Adams, 1960) who found that participants’ confidence in their ability to
recognize correctly spelled words was higher than their actual accuracy at the
task. Five years later, Oskamp (1965) found that when clinical psychologists
were asked to make a diagnosis for a case study, their confidence in their
decision increased when they were given more information about the case
although their accuracy did not increase. These instances showed that
confidence and accuracy were not necessarily correlated in both experimental
studies and in more practical issues of clinical diagnoses – a finding that has
persisted in modern research on memory as well (Hirst et al., 2015; Kvavilashvili,
Mirani, Schlagman, Foley, & Kornbrot, 2009), which will be discussed below.
Throughout the years, overconfidence as a field continued to be studied in
many different contexts such as social situations (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, &
Ross, 1990; Vallone, Griffin, Lin, & Ross, 1990), tasks of differing degrees of
difficulty (Bradley, 1981; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Sen & Boe, 1991), and
ways to reduce overconfidence (Arkes, Christensen, Lai, & Blumer, 1987;
Zechmeister, Rusch, & Markell, 1986). In this research, there was a common
finding of overconfidence in wrong answers (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein,
1977; Harvey, 1990; Howell, 1971; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; May, 1986)
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and a less common finding of under-confident correct answers or top performers
(Sieber, 1979) as the focus of the research at that time was not the high
performers. The term “overconfidence effect” developed to describe this pattern
of higher self-estimates of confidence than ability. Throughout this period,
though, theoretical frameworks to account for these metacognitive illusions
remained relatively sparse.
In 1999, the relationship between of over and under-confidence was
further characterized by David Dunning and Justin Kruger, who explored
combining the two effects under one term. In a landmark study, Dunning and
Kruger conducted several studies showing that bottom performers on a logical
reasoning task overestimated their task performance scores and that,
conversely, top performers underestimated their task performance scores. The
name “The Dunning-Kruger Effect” (DKE) became highly popularized throughout
mainstream culture and society.
Generically, the DKE describes a phenomenon in which self-estimates of
performance on a task and percentile ranking among others also participating in
the task do not match performance accuracy and actual rank respectively. The
direction of this mis-match of self-perception extends in both directions (Sieber,
1979). More specifically, the DKE describes the phenomenon in which poor
performers on a task tend to overestimate their performance while high
performers on a task tend to underestimate their performance, but the cognitive
processes, which lead to these illusory experiences, have yet to be fully explored
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or understood. The goal of the current proposal is to further investigate the DKE
by taking physiological measurements of metacognitive judgments at the time
that DKE estimates are made, as well as to explore group-level differences in
physiology during the task itself (a cognitive test of memory, see methods) to
investigate differences in neural activity for performance which may account,
among over and under estimators. The goal is to provide novel insight into the
cognitive factors that may underlie this pervasive effect of illusory metacognition.
These aims will be accomplished using electroencephalography (EEG) to record
neural activity occurring at the scalp during performance on both an episodic
memory task and during the estimation judgment about performance on the task.
This endeavor represents a novel paradigmatic method we have developed for
measuring the DKE and provides an opportunity to gain a deeper understanding
of the neurocognitive processes underlying it.

The Dunning-Kruger Effect
The DKE is a psychological phenomenon described by a mismatch in
one’s perceived ability and the reality of one’s objective performance on a given
task, and this appears to be directionally moderated by the factor of ability. Low
performers (individuals who do not earn high scores on a test using an objective
scale) tend to overestimate their performance on a task while high performers
(individuals who earn high scores measured on an objective scale) tend to
underestimate their performance on the same task. This miscalibration is most
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often measured using two different questions. The first type of question asks
participants to estimate their score using an objective scale (objective
performance estimate). The second type of question tends to ask participants to
estimate the percentile in which they rank in relation to other students/group of
individuals participating in the experiment (relative performance estimate).
Researchers of the DKE generally find that low performers tend to
overestimate their objective performance on a task, which then inflates their
subsequent relative performance estimate (Adams & Adams, 1960; Burson,
Larrick, & Klayman, 2006; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999;
Oskamp, 1965; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2017; Ryvkin, Krajč, &
Ortmann, 2012a; C. Sanchez & Dunning, 2018). However, there are some
different findings about high performers. Dunning and Kruger (1999) found that
high performers tend to accurately judge their objective score on a task but
underestimate their relative performance score. They argue that low performers’
and high performers’ estimates of their objective score should be rather different.
Even though low performers judge their raw score to be higher than it is, their
estimates are not as high as the high performers’ estimates. Because high
performers perform much better on the task than low performers and they tend to
estimate their score accurately, their estimates are above even the inflated
estimates of the low performers. However, other studies have found that high
performers still underestimate their objective score rather than gauging their
score accurately (Burson et al., 2006; Pennycook et al., 2017; Schlösser,
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Dunning, Johnson, & Kruger, 2013) which does not fit Dunning and Kruger’s
explanation for high performers’ metacognitive errors. Currently, this discrepancy
has not been resolved.
Nevertheless, both low and high performers should have similar relative
estimates of performance. Because high performers underestimate their relative
score, their estimates decrease and become closer to the low performers’
inflated relative estimates. Measuring the relative estimate should provide the
largest difference between estimated performance and objective rank for both
high and low performers. This measurement of difference between estimates and
accuracy will provide the critical measure of the DKE in the current study and is
why the current proposal will focus on relative performance estimates.
Most of the paradigms used to research the DKE in the extant literature
follow a similar format: participants are given a task such as a series of logical
reasoning problems or math problems, etc., and after they finish the task in its
entirety, they are asked to estimate their overall objective score on the task itself
and/or their relative performance. Thus, the data point for their metacognitive
judgment is a single data point assessed at the conclusion of the study and it
represents their aggregated assessment of performance across a great many of
trial instances. Empirically, this paradigm has been used successfully in many
different situations to elicit the DKE on such tasks as knowledge of
microeconomics material on a midterm and final (Ryvkin, Krajč, & Ortmann,
2012b), knowledge about the University of Chicago (Burson et al., 2006), ability
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to identify humorous jokes (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), logical reasoning
(Schlösser et al., 2013), cognitive reflection (Pennycook et al., 2017), size
judgments (Sanchez, 2016), finance (Atir, Rosenzweig, & Dunning, 2015), and
computer programming (Critcher & Dunning, 2009). More broadly, the effect has
been obtained in popular culture contexts of driving (Svenson, 1981) and
professors rating their own teaching skills (Cross, 1977).
Variations to the Classic Dunning-Kruger Effect Paradigm
There have been some deviations from this basic paradigm structure that
have also elicited a similar effect. Simons (2013) used a priori estimates instead
of the traditional post hoc estimates by asking participants to play several card
games of Bridge and to predict each game’s outcome in point value before the
game had begun. Simons found that low performing players overestimated their
point value consistently. However, higher performing players also overestimated
their point value, though not as much as low performers. This experiment
showed some characteristics of the DKE but differed critically in the placement of
the DKE estimate questions, which came before completing the card game,
whereas typical DKE research usually asks the estimate question after the task
has been completed, and this could have contributed to the unique findings of
high-performer-overestimation because they have lacked the insight from
experience of a completed task to help inform their estimates. Nevertheless, the
discrepancy between the high and low performers still remained in their overall
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estimates, and the question remains as to what cognitive processes are
underlying this group-level difference in metacognitive assessments.
There seems to be an important difference between asking participants to
make estimates before they complete a task and after they complete a task.
Asking for an estimate before completing the task speaks more to one’s selfperception. Before one completes a task, the only information one can draw on is
preconceived notions about one’s ability from prior experiences. However, this is
not the core of what the DKE appears to refer to in its canonical form. The
essence of the DKE is instead characterized by the overconfidence of individuals
who inaccurately believed that they completed the task well but did not, and the
inaccurate under-confidence of individuals who believed they did not perform at
the top but did. These delineations are inherently retrospective in their nature and
require a different type of cognition and metacognition than future predictions
(Schacter, 2012; Schacter & Addis, 2007; Schacter, Benoit, De Brigard, &
Szpunar, 2015). For this reason, the current work will seek to focus on data
acquired by asking for estimates after the task is completed.
One beneficial innovation offered by Simons’ (2013) study is that it
introduced an important novel development in paradigms, which motivated the
current investigation. This paradigm introduced a repeated measures factor for
the score estimate in the card game that was not present in most of the extant
literature about overconfidence. Simons’ participants played several games of
bridge in the same session, and provided estimates before every game. These
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repeated measurements allowed Simons to assess changes in participants’
estimates over a relatively short amount of time. He found that participants did
not correct their overestimates even after discovering by the end of the game that
their estimates were in fact too high. This result inspired the repeated measures
design for the current proposal by providing evidence that participants will not
self-correct their overestimates even over a short period of time; the procedure
allows us the flexibility to track changes in individuals’ estimates as well.
Theoretical Accounts and Models of the Dunning-Kruger Effect
Dunning and Kruger postulated that the reason for low performer’s
incorrect estimation for objective performance score is due to meta-ignorance or
two-fold ignorance (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). This means that poor performers
are unaware that they are ignorant of the details needed to correctly complete
the task and that double ignorance bolsters feelings of false superiority
(Schacter, 2012). More simply, poor performers do not have the knowledge to
complete the task correctly and because they do not know their answers are
incorrect, they believe they are performing well. For example, poor performers on
a task of logical reasoning ability did not have the necessary knowledge to
answer the questions in the test correctly. They were also unaware that their
answers were incorrect providing them with false confidence that they answered
correctly (Schlösser et al., 2013). While this is a very useful behavioral
description, it does little to advance an understanding of the cognitive processes
involved in this pervasive illusion.
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Dunning and Kruger also used what they coined “reach-aroundknowledge” to explain low performers’ high confidence in their abilities. The term
‘reach-around knowledge’ refers to a person’s unique knowledge gained from
previously participating in a task similar to the presented task and generalizing
their past experiences to the current situation (Dunning, 2011). Kruger and
Dunning postulated that participants use reach-around knowledge to help
achieve their estimation, though this doesn’t necessarily require that it leads
them to an accurate perception. According to this view, in order to give an
overestimation, one must first have knowledge about the same or similar tasks
but not have the knowledge about the details of the task to complete it correctly.
Having a larger store of reach-around knowledge should therefore increase the
overestimation of poor performer’s scores. On the contrary, having a smaller
store of reach-around knowledge should decrease the overestimation of one’s
abilities resulting in a more accurate performance estimate.
Dunning and Kruger’s “reach-around-knowledge” account has not yet
been operationally defined or objectively measured and lacks a substantive
theoretical foundation in cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, it provides a useful
platform from which to expand in investigating this phenomenon. The reacharound-knowledge account provided by Dunning and Kruger refers to changes in
current behavior based upon prior experience, which is a defining feature of
memory, and as such it recognizes a key role that memory processes may play
in contributing to this metacognitive illusion. There is a rich and robust empirical
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history of memory processes being both theoretically and operationally defined
and studied. Here, we will focus on the possible role of episodic memory for the
DKE. Two aspects of episodic memory that may contribute to the DKE are
familiarity and recollection. These processes align closely with the general
concepts that Dunning and Kruger attributed to their reach-around-knowledge
account, and can be drawn upon to approach the DKE in a systematic manner,
as discussed in the sections below.

Memory Research
Memory Confidence and Accuracy
Memory research intersects with the DKE at the point of confidence in
one’s memories and the accuracy of those memories. A large collection of
research is available that supports the finding that high confidence does not
beget high accuracy. Brown and Kulik (1977) lead the charge in studying this
lack of correlation in the late 1970’s with an article about flashbulb memories.
Flashbulb memories are defined by a sharp, vivid memory of one’s immediate
surroundings caused by a surprising, salient, often upsetting incident. Individuals
who form flashbulb memories have high confidence in the accuracy of those
memories, almost as if they had taken a mental picture of their environment
using a camera (old cameras provided flash using a bulb, hence the term
“flashbulb” memory). Since then, flashbulb memories have been studied using
major traumatic events such as the 9/11 attacks (Hirst et al., 2015; Kvavilashvili
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et al., 2009; Shapiro, 2006; Smith, Bibi, & Sheard, 2003), the Challenger space
shuttle (Bohannon & Symons, 1992; Neisser & Harsch, 1992), and the 2015
attacks on Paris (Gandolphe & El Haj, 2017). Many of these studies found that
flashbulb memories were no more accurate than other memories despite the
participants’ high confidence in their accuracy (Neisser & Harsch, 1992).
Therefore, the evidence indicates that flashbulb memories are just as susceptible
to forgetting as normal memories (Hirst et al., 2015) but do not suffer from the
same decrease in confidence of accuracy as normal memories (Talarico &
Rubin, 2003).
Other research has shown that memories can be manipulated and
distorted. Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978) found that asking participants leading
questions led them to claim they remembered information that was not actually
presented to them. Another hallmark study showed evidence that participants
could be induced to form rich memories of events that never occurred during
their childhood simply by asking the participant’s close relatives to corroborate
the false memory (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). These examples show how easily
memories can be changed, formed, and manipulated.
Some of the most impactful research on memory failing to correlate with
accuracy pertains to the legal system (Heaton-Armstrong, Shepherd,
Gudjonsson, & Wolchover, 2006; Loftus, 1975; Loftus & Zanni, 1975; Nadel &
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2012; Pena, Klemfuss, Loftus, & Mindthoff, 2017; Schacter &
Loftus, 2013). Pena et al. (2017) conducted research asking participants to make
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judgments about their accuracy on a memory test for a mock crime observed
earlier in a study. Interestingly, they found that participants who performed poorly
on the memory test for details of a mock crime overestimated their memory
accuracy. Their results were consistent with the results of poor performers
exhibiting the DKE, suggesting that a link may exist between the two domains of
memory and illusory superiority.
Memory Confidence and Familiarity
Other studies investigating the subtler and more nuanced side of memory
and accuracy have been conducted using a false fame paradigm. Experiments
on false fame highlight the idea that familiarity with names can lead to falsely
recognizing them as famous later (Dywan & Jacoby, 1990; Jacoby, Kelley,
Brown, & Jasechko, 1989; Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989, 2004). In Jacoby’s
experiments, participants read a list of non-famous names that they were tested
on either immediately after reading the list or 24 hours after reading the list.
Participants who were tested one day later were more likely than participants
tested immediately to mistakenly judge non-famous names from the previous list
as famous.
In addition, participants were presented some non-famous names once
and some four times. The non-famous names presented four times were less
likely to be judged as famous due to more recollection of the context (that the list
of names previously read were non-famous). The names only read once were
more familiar to the participants, yet not so familiar that they remembered the
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context surrounding the name. However, this familiarity caused participants to
believe an ordinary name was famous because they could not recollect the
context in which the name was presented. These ideas of familiarity and
recollection are more than just layperson’s terms for differences in memory
strength; they are cognitive process subsets of episodic memory that have
garnered substantial research support, and are discussed in detail below.
Familiarity and Recollection
The cognitive processes of recollection and familiarity have been featured
prominently in theoretical models of episodic memory for several decades
(Eichenbaum, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2007; Khoe, Kroll, Yonelinas, Dobbins, &
Knight, 2000; Rugg & Curran, 2007; Squire, Wixted, & Clark, 2007; Yonelinas,
1999, 2002). Familiarity refers to having exposure to some material but not being
able to recall the context in which it was presented. Recollection refers instead to
recall of specific contextual details from prior episodic experiences.
Familiarity relates strongly to the false fame effect because seeing a nonfamous name once had the effect of eliciting a similar amount of familiarity as
mildly famous names that participants many have seen once before (Addante,
Ranganath, & Yonelinas, 2012; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Jacoby, Kelley, et al.,
1989; Jacoby et al., 2004; Jacoby, Woloshyn, et al., 1989; Woodruff, Hayama, &
Rugg, 2006; Yu & Rugg, 2010). Importantly, the participants lost the context in
which the non-famous names were presented and were more likely to judge
them as famous. The cognitive processes of recollection and familiarity clearly
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play an important role in accounting for the false fame effect, which has
implications for a theoretical account of the DKE by way of the shared elements
of inaccurate perceptual estimate of reality’s performance.
Physiological measurements using electroencephalography (EEG) have
also been recorded for familiarity and recollection. Familiarity has been
associated with event-related potentials (ERP) differences in old and new
memory trials during a negative-going peak at the mid-frontal scalp sites at
approximately 400 milliseconds to 600 milliseconds post stimulus, called the midfrontal old-new effect, or FN400 (for frontal-N400 effect). On the other hand,
recollection has been associated with differences between memory conditions
occurring at a peak in the ERP at the parietal region of the scalp from
approximately 600 milliseconds to 900 milliseconds, or LPC (Addante et al.,
2012; Leynes et al., 2005; for reviews see Rugg & Curran, 2007; Friedman,
2013).

Metacognition and Metamemory
Another way to study inaccurate estimates of performance is through
behavioral measures of memory confidence of familiarity and recollection, for
which an extensive literature of research exists (Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas &
Parks, 2007). Deciding how much confidence one places in their own memory
can only be done by thinking about one’s memory processes. This term is called
metacognition and it is used widely to study self-estimates of learning.
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One way that researchers can study inaccurate estimations of
performance in the DKE is by taking measurements of metacognition.
Metacognition is often described as thinking about one’s own cognitive
processes to become aware of one’s strengths and weaknesses in one’s own
thinking (Flavell, 1979). Some examples of metacognition are thinking about
what presentation method most engages you in class and understanding your
procrastination habits. Thinking about how likely you are to remember a learned
topic at a later time is an example of a specific subset of metacognition called
metamemory, described as thinking specifically about one’s memory processes.
A common method used to study metamemory employs judgments of
learning (JOLs) and judgments of remembering or knowing. JOLs ask
participants to judge how confidently they believe they will remember a studied
item during an upcoming test phase (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991) and judgments of
remembering or knowing ask participants to judge how confidently they believe
their memory for that event will be accompanied by contextual details
(remembering) or without contextual details (knowing). McCabe and Soderstrom
(2011) gave participants a list of nouns and asked them to make either a JOL (by
indicating that they would remember or not remember the word) or a judgments
of remembering or knowing which they termed a “JORK” (by indicating if they
believed they would recollect, know, or forget the word upon retrieval) during
encoding. At retrieval, they asked participants to either give a
remember/know/forget judgment or a studied/not studied judgment. They found
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that participants who were assigned JORKs during encoding and
remember/know/forget judgments at retrieval had better accuracy than
participants assigned to give JOLs and studied/not studied judgments. However,
the reason these differences exist is still unknown.
While JORKs ask participants to judge how well they would remember
contextual details at the time of testing (i.e. the future), it would be informative to
explore why JORK differences at encoding and remember/know/forget judgment
differences at retrieval emerge. One possibility is that accuracy may have
improved for JORKs because the information asked of JORKs is more specific:
the participant was cued to remember the context surrounding the word. JOLs do
not offer as many contextual cues as JORKs due to the nature of the simplistic
task of indicating if the word would be remembered or not. However, that
simplicity was not guided in any way and the participant may not know what
stimuli are important to remember as retrieval cues. Because of that simple yet
broad judgment, JOLs may produce less accurate retrieval than JORKs.
Similarly, because giving assessments for JOLs lead to less accuracy, if
participants were asked to give estimates of the retrieval score, their estimates
may also be less accurate because they cannot recollect the items they
recognized or the ones they forgot. However, because JORKs lead to more
accurate recognition, they may provide more accurate estimates. Therefore,
JOLs could result in overconfidence because of the simplicity of the task
compared to JORKs.
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Metamemory has also been studied in conjunction with judgment
heuristics. Heuristics are mental shortcuts the brain uses to make assumptions
that lead to quick decisions. One heuristic relevant to metamemory is the fluency
heuristic, which assumes that information that is processed more quickly has
higher value, or is more appropriate and applicable to the current question or
task and will hence influence the decision more heavily (Bruett & Leynes, 2015;
Jacoby & Brooks, 1984; Leynes & Zish, 2012; Whittlesea & Leboe, 2000, 2003).
Said more simply, information processed quickly is viewed as more important
than information processed more slowly.
Students have been found to use the fluency heuristic to judge how well
they learned material from a professor (Carpenter, Mickes, Rahman, &
Fernandez, 2016). In (Carpenter et al., 2016) study, participants were assigned
to watch one of two videos of a professor giving a lecture in a fluent or disfluent
manner and then were given a test of the material they learned. In the fluent
condition, the professor spoke confidently and clearly and was engaged with the
students while in the disfluent condition, the professor was disengaged, hesitant,
and did not confidently present the material. Students were then asked to
estimate their score on the test and indicate how much they believed their
learning was due to the professor, the material, and their ability to learn.
The students who rated the professor as being integral to their JOL (27%
of the fluent condition) earned a significantly lower score than they had estimated
while students in the disfluent condition (45% of the disfluent condition) correctly
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estimated their test score. Importantly, however, the amount of learning did not
differ between the two groups (Carpenter et al., 2016). These findings indicate
that there can be clear differences in the perception of our learning despite there
being no differences in actual reality of learning, but these findings leave open
and unresolved the underlying reason for why this distinction between perception
and reality occurs in learning and in memory.
Physiological Measurements of Metacognition
In addition to studying behavioral responses for JOLs, physiological data
have also been collected during JOLs using (ERPs) derived from
electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings. One of the first of these recordings was
done by Sommer, Heinz, Leuthold, Matt, and Schweinberger (1995). They
showed participants a list of faces and asked them to make JOLs judging their
perceived ability to recognize the faces upon retrieval. They found that faces that
were later correctly recognized showed a positive wave from 300ms to 1000ms
in the left parietal region of the scalp, much like the LPC. However, this wave did
not differ between positive and negative JOL conditions (Sommer et al., 1995).
The authors concluded that JOLs and recognition memory are very closely
related, which provides support for our hypothesis that memory processes play a
key role in judgments of self-performance (i.e.: Dunning-Kruger judgments).
Other ERP studies of JOLs and memory corroborated and expanded upon
Sommer et al.'s (1995) findings. Müller et al. (2016) conducted an experiment in
which participants studied pairs of pictures and were prompted to give JOLs after
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learning each picture pair, assessing the participant’s confidence that they would
remember one picture given the other picture as a cue upon retrieval. The ERPs
for the JOL condition and a control condition in which participants did not make
any JOLs were compared. The pattern of ERPs showed that conditions differed
reliably on the medial frontal scalp sites from 300 milliseconds (ms) to 700 ms, as
well as at bilateral negative occipital sites from 350 ms to 700 ms. This negative
wave is reminiscent of the FN400 that is characteristic of familiarity, which will be
discussed in more depth in the next section below.
Another study found evidence of ERPs consistent with recollection and
familiarity in JOLs. Skavhaug, Wilding, and Donaldson (2010, 2013) asked
participants to study pairs or two words and provide a JOL about later
remembering one word of the pair when cued with the other. Then ERPs of items
with high JOLs and low JOLs were plotted. Although a negative wave was
present from 400 ms to 600 ms at the fronto-central electrode cites, the wave
was not significantly different for high JOLs and low JOLs. However, the LPC
was evident in the centro-parietal electrodes from 550 ms to 1000 ms when high
and low JOLs were compared with high JOLs exhibiting a larger wave. This
result suggests that higher JOLs elicited more recollection and that memory may
also be an integral contributor to these types of self-judgment.
Together, these studies show that the FN400 and LPC are evident in the
ERPs during metacognitive judgments, and importantly, also showing that ERPs
are capable of capturing these sensitive memory processes in metacognitive
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judgements. It also gives support to the idea that familiarity and recollection may
be a key cognitive process involved in the metacognitive judgments used to form
Dunning-Kruger estimates by both high and low performers. Although the LPC
was not evident in Sommer et al.’s study, it is possible that changes in the
paradigm or analyses account for the difference.
The results of these studies support the current hypothesis that memory is
heavily involved in metacognitive judgments about one’s ability to perform well on
a memory task. Low performers who tend to over-estimate their ability and score
may do so because of familiarity with previous experiences in similar situations.
High performers who tend to under-estimate their ability and score may use more
recollection in their metacognitive judgments. This provides more support for the
hypothesis that ERPs will be able to capture evidence of familiarity and
recollection in DKE metacognitive judgements.

A Memory-Based Framework for the Dunning-Kruger Effect
Many of the accounts of the DKE have focused primarily upon
interpretations based upon metacognition and competency (Adams & Adams,
1960; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Oskamp, 1965;
Pennycook et al., 2017; Ryvkin et al., 2012a; C. Sanchez & Dunning, 2018).
However, it is very likely that memory experiences in one’s past influencing the
real-time processing of the current information- either via explicit or implicit
means- could also be contributing to DKEs.

22

In episodic memory, theoretical models of recognition are largely
governed by the dual processes of familiarity and recollection (Diana, Yonelinas,
& Ranganath, 2008; Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Ranganath, 2010; Yonelinas,
2002; Yonelinas, Aly, Wang, & Koen, 2010) (though see Wixted, 2007 and
Wixted & Mickes, 2010 for nuanced alternative views), and it is possible that
understanding of familiarity and recollection processes in memory may help
explain a proportion of variance in the DKE.
Recollection is typically operationalized as the declarative retrieval of
episodic information of both the item and context bound together into a cohesive
retrieval of the episodic event (for review see Diana et al., 2008), and is usually
associated with the retrieval of contextual information surrounding the item of the
event (Addante et al. 2012a; for reviews see Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Yonelinas
et al. 2010; Ranganath, 2010). The item may however be retrieved without
recollection and via reliance upon familiarity, typically conceptualized as retrieval
of an item from a prior episode but without the associated contextual information
in which it occurred. Familiarity occurs, for instance, when a person can
remember that someone seems familiar from the past but cannot retrieve who
the person is or from where they know them. Recollection, on the other hand,
would be remembering precisely who someone is and how you know them from
a prior episode of one’s past experience.
These two memory phenomena have been found to be dissociable
cognitive processes (Yonelinas, 2002), with dissociable neural substrates in the

23

medial temporal lobes (Ranganath et al., 2004), neuropsychologically dissociable
among patient impairments (Addante, Ranganath, Olichney, & Yonelinas, 2012;
Düzel et al., 1999; Mecklinger, von Cramon, & Matthes-von Cramon, 1998), and
with distinct patterns of electrophysiology at the scalp that is both spatially and
temporally dissociable in event-related potentials (ERPs) (Addante et al., 2012;
Curran, 2000; Friedman, 2013; Gherman & Philiastides, 2015; Rugg et al., 1998;
Rugg & Curran, 2007).
Based upon the converging literatures from memory and metacognition, a
viable alternative theory to explain the DKE is that the illusory superiority
experience may be driven, at least in part, by familiarity from prior experience
with the tested materials. This general familiarity may lead people to assume
high performance despite a lack of specific retrieval of the relevant details
required for real competency with the material. In this view, lacking distinct
recollection but being generally familiar with material will lead people to assume
that they are competent and successful, and would be associated with increased
FN400 amplitudes in ERPs for inaccurate over-estimators. In this case, for
example, it would be a dangerous combination to have insufficient recollection
but excessive familiarity with a given topic, stimuli, or information. By contrast,
under-estimators of self-performance may be marked by having had higher
recollection of the study material (e.g. competency) such that these instances are
associated with an LPC, while also leading people to perhaps recollect noncriterial information that could still be relatively wrong, hence lowering their
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estimated scores relative to other people. In this case, the excess of recollection
signal would outweigh the relative noise of uncertain familiarity.

Addressing the Gap in the Current Literature
There are several gaps in the literature were addressed in this study. First,
to our knowledge the traditional DKE has never before been elicited during the
retrieval stage of an episodic memory confidence task. We aimed to bridge this
gap and identify the DKE using a memory test paradigm in which participants are
tested on their memory for the words in the test phase using a confidence
gradient to indicate confidence in their answer.
Second, another gap in the literature is that to the best of our knowledge,
no neurophysiological measures of the DKE have been recorded thus far. This
gap will be addressed by recording EEG measures of participants during the
actual metacognitive decisions underlying the DKE. Collecting physiological
measures of this cognitive illusion is an important element in better
understanding it and can provide insight into its underpinnings by revealing ERP
effects that are reliably associated in the cognitive neuroscience literature with
memory processes such as recollection and familiarity. Additionally, these EEG
measures can reveal any potential contribution of implicit memory processes that
could also be influencing the DKE via activation of information unavailable to
conscious awareness (Addante, 2015; Leynes & Addante, 2016; Rugg et al.,
1998; Wolk et al., 2004; Woodruff, Hayama, & Rugg, 2006; Yu & Rugg, 2010)
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Third, an additional innovation we will bring to the field of DKE research is
the paradigm of repeatedly asking participants to provide their performance
estimates in relation to other students at several times during a single session of
cognitive task performance. Most DKE literature to date only asks for the
participants’ performance estimates once, at the end of the task. Although we will
still also ask for an overall estimate at the end of the study, our novel design of
repeatedly asking for DKE estimates during the retrieval task will allow us to
collect numerous samples of neural activity during a single participant’s DKE
decisions and analyze the brain activity of high and low performers while they are
making their self-judgments.

Current Study
The current paradigm has been designed to study the decision-making
process as it occurs in real-time during DKE relative performance estimates
provided by participants throughout an item recognition memory test. The DKE is
characterized in terms of two measures: self-estimates of an objective score on a
test or task and a relative estimate in relation to their peers. To maintain
simplicity during a lengthy memory test, the current proposal only asked relative
performance estimate questions (and not the self-estimate of overall objective
score) throughout the test phase of the experiment. This approach is consistent
with prior work by many researchers who also ask for estimates in relation to
other people (Critcher & Dunning, 2009; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Guillory &
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Blankson, 2017; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Schlösser et al., 2013). After every ten
word recognition trials during the test phase, participants were asked to estimate
in which percentile they believed they were performing up to that point on the
task. We did not ask for repeated estimates of objective scores on the test
because the more critical question for the DKE seems to concern the relative
performance estimate in comparison to one’s peers.
The current proposal’s hypotheses are focused upon neural activity at the
moment of metacognitive decisions; accordingly, the current study asked a DKE
relative performance estimate once every ten slides during the item recognition
memory test. One of the reasons for such repeated testing is because assessing
ERPs of the DKE metacognitive decision-making process requires having
sufficient trials per condition to overcome signal-to-noise ratios, usually a
minimum of approximately n = 12 trials per condition in each participant
contributing to group ERP effects. Presenting the Dunning-Kruger question
interspersed among memory questions after every ten trials was designed as a
compromise between the need to collect as many trials as possible without
substantively lengthening the time of the experiment out of concern of fatigue
effects.
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CHAPTER TWO
METHOD

Participants
The total sample of participants consisted of 62 right-handed students free
from neurological and memory problems recruited from a university in Southern
California. Five participants’ data were not used due to noncompliance issues
and one participant did not have usable data due to technical difficulties. Two
participants did not have usable EEG data but were included in behavioral
analyses. The majority of our participants were women (N = 48); 56.5% were
Hispanic, 22.6% were Caucasian, 11.3% were Asian, and 9.7% identified as
more than one ethnicity of a different ethnicity. The average age of our
participants was 23.52 years old (SD = 4.82). None of our participants reported
any visual, medical, or physical issues that would interfere with the experiment.
Most participants spoke English as their first language (N = 47) and the 15
participants who indicated speaking a different language first had been speaking
English for an average of 16.73 years (SD = 4.74). Participants were recruited
through a combination of methods including advertisements placed around
campus or through an online recruitment website. Participants recruited through
advertisements were paid $10 an hour for sessions that lasted approximately
three hours and participants recruited the website received 8 units of credit.
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Memory Test Paradigm
The paradigm used to test our hypotheses and elicit the DKE was a
modified item recognition confidence test, building from similar paradigms
successfully used in our lab’s prior research (Addante et al., 2012; Addante,
Watrous, Yonelinas, Ekstrom, & Ranganath, 2011; Addante, 2015; Addante, de
Chastelaine, & Rugg, 2015; Addante, Ranganath, Olichney, & Yonelinas, 2012)
and described in further detail below. This paradigm consisted of an encoding
phase containing four study sessions, in which participants studied 54 words in
each session, and a retrieval phase containing six test sessions in which the
participant’s memory was tested for 54 words in each session. They viewed a
total of 324 words, 216 of which were presented in the encoding phase and 116
of which were unstudied (new) items.

Behavioral and Electrophysiological Measures
Both behavioral and physiological measurements of the DKE were
recorded. The behavioral measurements consisted of participants’ responses on
the memory test. Participants were grouped into quartiles based on their
percentile score on the test, allowing us to average each group’s responses and
test them against the other group’s average responses to determine significant
differences. They were also grouped by errors in percentile estimates; groups of
over-estimators, correct-estimators, and under-estimators (also referred to as
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Dunning-Kruger groups later) were constructed to investigate potential
differences in cognitive strategies.
Physiological measurements of brain activity were recorded using EEG
equipment from Brain Vision LLC. All EEG data was processed en masse using
the ERPLAB toolbox from Matlab (Delorme & Makeig, 2004; Lopez-Calderon &
Luck, 2014). The EEG data were grouped based on the above categories for
each type of response, which allowed us to determine if there were significant
differences in brain activity between our relevant conditions. The EEG data was
first re-referenced to the average of the mastoid electrodes, passed through a
high-pass filter at 0.1 hertz as a linear de-trend of drift components, and then
downsampled to 256 hertz. The EEG data was epoched from 200 milliseconds
prior to the onset of the stimulus to 1200 milliseconds after the stimulus was
presented and then categorized based on performance group and response
accuracy.
Independent components analysis (ICA) was performed using InfoMax
techniques in EEGLab (Bell & Sejnowski, 1995) to accomplish artifact correction
and then the resulting data was individually inspected for artifacts, rejecting trials
for eye blinks and other aberrant electrode activity. During ERP averaging, trials
exceeding ERP amplitudes of +/- 250 mV were excluded. Additional filtering,
such as a 30hz low pass filter, was applied to group ERPs in order to make
figures correspond to the similar ‘smoothing’ function that the standard process
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of taking the mean voltage between a given two latencies accomplishes during
statistical analyses of results.
Using the ERPLAB toolbox (Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2014), automatic
artifact detection for epoched data was also used to identify trials exceeding
specified voltages, in a series of sequential steps as noted below. Simple Voltage
Threshold identified and removed any voltage below -100ms. The Step-Like
Artifact function identified and removed changes of voltage exceeding a specified
voltage (100uV in this case) within a specified window (200ms), which are
characteristic of blinks and saccades. The Moving Window Peak-to-Peak
function is commonly used to identify blinks by finding the difference in amplitude
between the most negative and most positive points in the defined window
(200ms) and compared the difference to a specified criterion (100 uV). The
Blocking and Flatline function identified periods in which the voltage does not
change amplitude within a specified window (848ms). An automatic blink
analysis, Blink Rejection (alpha version), used a normalized cross-covariance
threshold of 0.7 and a blink width of 400ms to identify and remove blinks (Luck,
2014). Maps of scalp activity were created to assess the topographic distribution
of the effects.
In order to maintain sufficient signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), all comparisons
relied upon including only subjects that met a criterion of having a minimum of 12
artifact-free ERP trials per condition being contrasted (Addante et al., 2012;
Gruber and Otten, 2010; Kim et al., 2009; Otten et al., 2006; c.f. Luck, 2014).
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Procedure
Participants arrived at the lab and completed consent paperwork and
demographic information forms via voluntary self-report. The experiment
consisted of three stages: 1) the encoding phase, 2) EEG set up, 3) and the
retrieval phase. During the encoding phase, participants were given instructions
to make a simple decision about the word presented (Figure 1). The participants
were either asked to judge if the item was manmade or if the item was alive. The
instructions were presented in one of two counterbalanced orders: ABBA or
BAAB. The participants viewed four lists of 54 words during the encoding phase.
The stimuli were presented on a black computer screen in white letters. To
begin a trial, a screen with a small white cross at the center was presented for
one of three randomly chosen inter-stimuli-interval (ISI) times: 1 second, 2.5
seconds, or 3 seconds. Then, the stimulus word appeared in the middle of the
screen with ‘YES’ presented to the bottom left of the word and ‘NO’ presented to
the bottom right of the word. The participants indicated their answer by pressing
buttons corresponding to ‘yes’ and ‘no’ with their index and middle fingers,
respectively. The response for this screen was self-paced by the participant.
After the participants responded, they viewed a blank black screen at a random
duration of 1 second, 2.5 seconds, or 3 seconds. After the blank screen, the
small white cross appeared at the center of the screen to begin the next trial.
This cycle continued until all 50 words in the all four lists were presented.
Between each list, participants were read the instructions for the next task to
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ensure they correctly switched between the animacy and the manmade decision
task.

Figure 1. Encoding Paradigm.
Participants viewed a fixation cross for one of three randomly chosen times and
then will be presented with the stimuli. After responding ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (to deciding if
the word is alive or manmade), the participants viewed a blank screen for one of
three randomly chosen times. After the blank screen, the fixation cross appeared
again and the cycle repeated until all 54 words were presented.

After the encoding phase was complete, the EEG cap was sized while the
participant’s face was wiped free of skin oil and/or makeup in preparation for
attaching ocular electrodes. Five ocular electrodes were applied to the face to
record electrooculograms (EOG): two above and below the left eye in line with
the pupil to record electrical activity from vertical eye movements, two on each
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temple to record electrical activity from horizontal eye movements, and one
electrode in the middle of the forehead in line horizontally with the electrode
above the left eye as the ground electrode. Then the EEG cap was placed on the
participant’s head and prepared for electrical recording. Gel was applied to each
cap site and impedances were lowered below 15 KOhms via gentle abrasion to
allow the electrodes to obtain a clear electrical signal.
After the EEG cap was in place, the participant began the retrieval phase.
The participants were read instructions asking them to judge if the stimulus word
presented was old (studied during the encoding phase) or new (not studied
before in the encoding phase; Figure 2).
As in the encoding phase, all stimulus words were presented in white font
on a black screen. To begin a trial, a screen with a small white cross at the
center was presented for one of three randomly chosen times: 1 second, 2.5
seconds, or 3 seconds. Then the participants were presented with a word in the
middle of the screen, the numbers “1”, “2”, “3”, “4”, and “5” evenly spaced
beneath the word, the word “New” on the left by the number “1”, and the word
“Old” on the right under the number “5”. Participants pressed any number
between “1” and “5” to indicate if they confidently believed the word was old (“5”),
believe the word was old but was not confident (“4”), did not know if the word was
old or new (“3”), believe the word was new but was not confident (“2”), or
confidently believed the word was new (“1”). Participants were told to choose the
response that gave us the most accurate reflection of their memory.
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Immediately after that decision, they were asked to answer if the word
came from the animacy decision task or the manmade decision task. The word
and numbers remained on the screen but this time, word “Alive” was presented
on the left by the number “1”, and the word “Manmade” was presented on the
right under the number “5”. Participants were told to choose the response that
gave us the most accurate reflection of their memory and could respond that they
confidently believed the word was from the animacy task (“1”), believed the word
was from the animacy task but were not confident (“2”), did not know the source
of the word or had replied in the question directly before that the word was new
(“3”), believed the word was from the manmade task but were not confident (“4”),
or confidently believed the word was from the manmade task (“5”). After that, a
blank black screen was presented for a randomly chosen time of 1 second, 2.5
seconds, or 3 seconds. Participants were instructed to blink only during this blank
screen and avoid blinking during the screens with a small cross or stimuli. The
white cross was presented after the blank screen and the cycle continued until
after the 10th word has been presented.
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Figure 2. Retrieval Paradigm.
Participants viewed a fixation cross for one of three randomly chosen times.
Then participants viewed the stimulus and indicated their confidence for the item
memory and source memory. Then participants viewed a blank screen for one of
three randomly chosen times and then the fixation cross appeared again
continuing the cycle. For every 10th stimulus presented, the participants viewed
the Dunning-Kruger Estimate asking participants to estimate the percentile in
which they believed they were performing up to that point on the task in relation
to other students.

After each 10th word presented, the Dunning-Kruger estimate was
presented. Participants received instructions asking them to estimate the
percentile in which they believed they were performing up to that point in the test
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compared to other students who would participate in the study. During the test
phase, the word “Percentile?” was presented as a prompt for their estimate with
the numbers “<60%,”, “60’s”, “70’s”, “80’s”, and “90%+” evenly spaced beneath it.
The Dunning-Kruger estimate was participant-paced. After the participant
responded, the blank screen was presented and the next cycle of ten words were
presented.
Six lists of 54 words were presented during the retrieval phase, each with
five DKE questions interspersed (after trials 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50). After the last
list of 54 words was presented, participants answered four Dunning-Kruger posttest questions asking them to estimate their objective score on the whole test,
their relative percentile on the whole test, how good their memory is in everyday
life, and the overall difficulty of the test.

Dunning-Kruger Post-Test Questions
At the conclusion of the memory retrieval test, participants were asked two
additional questions concerning the DKE (Figure 3). First, they were asked to
“Estimate your score on the whole test”. Participants were prompted to respond
on a 5-point scale with “1” meaning below 60%, “2” meaning between 60 and
69%, “3” meaning between 70 and 79%, “4” meaning between 80 and 89
percent, and “5” meaning above 90%. The following scale was shown evenly
spaced below each prompt: “<60%,”, “60’s”, “70’s”, “80’s”, and “90%+”. The
second questions they were asked was the following: “In what percentile did you
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perform on the whole test?”. The participants were prompted to respond on a 5point scale with “1” meaning below the 60th percentile, “2” meaning between the
60th and 69th percentile, “3” meaning between the 70th and 79th percentile, “4”
meaning between 80th and 89th percentile, and “5” meaning in the 90th percentile
or above. The following scale will be shown evenly spaced below each prompt:
“<60%,”, “60’s”, “70’s”, “80’s”, and “90%+”.

Figure 3. Post-Test Dunning-Kruger Questions.
Participants were asked four questions at the end of the study and responded on
a five-point scale with the descriptions seen above.

38

The first questions measured perceived objective score on the entire
memory test while the second question measured perceived relative score in
relation to other students taking the memory test. These post-test prompts
allowed us to test for the DKE at a between-subjects level to be sure the effect
can be elicited using an episodic memory task.
Two additional post-test questions were also asked: 1) “Rate your memory
in everyday life” and 2) “How difficult was this entire test?”. For the first question,
participants responded on a 5-point scale with “1” meaning very hard, “2”
meaning hard, “3” meaning moderate, “4” meaning easy, and “5” meaning very
easy. For the second prompt, participants responded on a 5-point scale with “1”
meaning very bad, “2” meaning bad, “3” meaning moderate, “4” meaning good,
and “5” meaning very good. These questions may be used as covariates in later
analyses (Figure 3 above).
Hypotheses
The hypotheses for the current study are the following:
1. Low performers will significantly overestimate their relative percentile while
high performers will underestimate their relative percentile on the post-test
Dunning-Kruger questions.
2. A larger FN400 will be evident in the group level ERPs for low performers
compared to high performers for the in-test Dunning-Kruger questions at
the mid-frontal electrode sites from approximately 400 ms to 600ms.
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3. A larger LPC will be evident in the group level ERPs for high performers
compared to low performers for the relative post-test Dunning-Kruger
questions at the left parietal electrode sites at approximately 600 ms to
900 ms.
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CHAPTER THREE
RESULTS

Behavioral Results
Episodic Memory
We excluded a total of five participants from behavioral analysis. Four
were excluded due to non-compliance issues while one was excluded for
technical difficulties during the experiment.
Item Memory Performance. Recognition memory response distributions
for recognition of old and new items are displayed in Table 1. Item recognition
accuracy was calculated as the proportion of hits (M = .81, SD = .11) – proportion
of false alarms (M = .24, SD = .14) (i.e. pHit-pFA). Participants performed item
recognition at relatively high levels (M = .57, SD = .15) which was greater than
chance, t(55) = 3.59, p < .001. In addition, participants’ accuracy for high
confidence item recognition trials (‘5’s’) was significantly greater than low
confidence item recognition trials (‘4’s’), t(55) = 9.04, p < .001.

Table 1. Distribution of Responses for Each Item Response as a Proportion of All
Memory Responses
Item Recognition Confidence
1
2
3
4
5
All Old Items
.09
.07
.04
.21
.60
All New Items
.43
.23
.10
.15
.08
.13
.06
.04
.16
.60
Animacy Task
.08
.04
.03
.14
.71
Manmade Task
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Source Memory Performance. Source memory response distributions for
recognition of old and new items are displayed in Table 2. Source memory
accuracy values were collapsed to include high and low source confidence
responses which were then divided by the sum of items receiving a correct and
incorrect source response to calculate the proportion. (Addante et al., 2012a,
2012b; Roberts et al., 2018). Mean accuracy for source memory was .30 (SD
= .19) and was reliably greater than chance, t(55) = 11.78, p < .001.

Table 2. Distribution of Responses for Each Source Response as a Proportion of
All Memory Responses
Source Recognition Confidence
1
2
3
4
5
All Old Items
.14
.14
.22
.17
.33
All New Items
.05
.08
.70
.09
.08
Animacy Task
.24
.17
.27
.16
.16
Manmade Task
.11
.11
.17
.2
.41

We also assessed the extent to which the current results could replicate
and extend source memory findings for differences among high and low
confidence item judgements that were reported by Addante et al., 2012a, since
that was a novel phenomenon which benefits from external validity of the
literature. When assessing source memory for each level of item hit responses,
participants’ accuracy for low confidence item recognition trials (‘4’s’) (M = .51,
SD = .24), t(55) = 15.78, p < .001) and high confidence item recognition trials
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(‘5’s’) (M = .68, SD = .10), t(55) = 50.54, p < .001) were each significantly greater
than chance, and reliably different from each other (t(55) = 5.33, p < .001). Of
note for this finding is that it replicated the prior findings of these unique condition
comparisons, extends this with a data set that was double the sample size of the
preceding work, and in a paradigm which permits assessing reaction times
associated with the cognitive processes supporting these source memory
judgements (see results below).
Accuracy for Item and Source Memory Combinations. The current
memory paradigm was adapted from prior work that reported uniquely different
response accuracies for correct source judgements that were preceded by high
and low levels of item recognition confidence hits (Addante et al., 2012). In order
to assess the extent to which those novel findings could be replicated with a
larger sample size and extended by assessing response time differences, the
same analysis was performed on the current data. Accuracy for high confidence
item judgments with low confidence source judgments (M = 0.68, SD = .10) was
more accurate than low confidence item judgments with low confidence source
judgments (M = 0.51, SD = 0.24), t(55) = 5.33, p < .001. The accuracy for both
the high confidence item judgments with low confidence source judgments and
the low confidence item judgments with low confidence source judgments were
each significantly greater than chance (t(55) = 50.54, p < .001; t(55) = 15.78, p
< .001, respectively).
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Response Speed for Episodic Memory Judgments
Reaction times for each item response are shown in Table 3 while
reaction times for each source response are shown in Table 4. Because paired ttest were conducted to investigate differences in response speeds within each
individual, participants were excluded from analysis if they did not have
responses in both of the comparisons. Participants responded significantly faster
when identifying hits than misses, t(55) = -6.23, p < .001, false alarms, t(55) = 4.43, p < .001, and correct rejections, t(55) = -3.52, p < .001. They also
responded significantly faster when identifying correct rejections than misses,
t(55) = 3.40, p = .001, and misses to false alarms, t(55) = 2.24, p = .03. There
were no significant differences between the reaction times for false alarms and
correct rejections, t(55) = 0.93, p = .35.

Table 3. Average Reaction Times for Each Item Memory Response
Item Reaction
Times
1
2
3
4
5
2547
3295
3151
2682
1852
All Old Items
(1067)
(1534)
(1678)
(752)
(394)
2205
3014
2897
2999
2085
All New Items
(671)
(1200)
(1858)
(868)
(820)
2451
3355
3376
2732
1853
Animacy Task
(990)
(1128)
(1352)
(976)
(378)
2470
3425
3254
2947
1765
Manmade Task
(782)
(1369)
(1391)
(1174)
(339)
Note. Values are in milliseconds with standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 4. Average Reaction Times for Each Source Memory Response
Source
1
2
3
4
5
Reaction Times
2168
2258
1589
2189
1776
All Old Items
(1193)
(1084)
(802)
(1066)
(827)
1615
2295
913
2043
1488
All New Items
(1106)
(1135)
(516)
(1034)
(998)
1791
2428
1366
2274
1744
Animacy Task
(742)
(1084)
(1039)
(1194)
(967
1961
2477
1405
2216
1635
Manmade Task
(951)
(1089)
(1079)
(981)
(785)
Note. Values are in milliseconds with standard deviations in parentheses.

In addition, participants responded significantly faster to high confidence
item recognition trials (M = 1897 ms, SD = 397 ms) than low confidence item
recognition trials (M = 2834 ms, SD = 1032 ms), t(49) = -8.10, p < .001. This
finding persisted even when source memory was held constant, comparing low
confidence item judgments with low confidence source judgments (M = 2833 ms,
SD = 1109 ms) to high confidence item judgments with low confidence source
judgments (M = 1950 ms, SD = 617 ms), t(47) = 6.96, p < .001 (Figure 4).
Differences observed in reaction time for items in which the source was correct
(M = 2322 ms, SD = 589 ms) and items for which the source was incorrect (M =
2475 ms, SD = 654 ms) approached significance but did not reach the threshold
of significance, t(54) = -1.77, p = .08 (Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Response Times for Item Recognition Judgments for Specific Item and
Source Memory Conditions.
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

Dunning-Kruger Response Judgments
The distribution of responses for each Dunning-Kruger response category for the
post-test and in-test Dunning-Kruger responses are shown in Table 5. When
plotted against actual performance, results from subjects’ reported performance
estimates revealed that the canonical Dunning-Kruger Effect was evident in the
dataset, thereby replicating the DKE and extending it to our episodic memory
paradigm (Figure 5).
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Table 5. Distribution of Responses for Each Dunning-Kruger Response, as a
Proportion of All Dunning-Kruger Responses
DKE Type

<60%

60-69%

70-79%

80-89%

>90%

In-Test DK Responses

.05

.20

.39

.29

.07

Post-Test DK Responses

.02

.11

.54

.30

.04

Figure 5. Actual Percentile and Estimated Percentile by Quartile.
Participants were separated by their actual percentile ranking. The low group
consists of those in the first quartile (less than or equal to 25%), the second
group consists of those in the second quartile (>25% and <=50%), the third group
consists of those in the third quartile (>50% and <=75%), and the high group
consists of those in fourth quartile (>75%). Participants who performed in the first
quartile showed the most overestimation while participants who performed in the
fourth quartile showed underestimation of their actual percentile.
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First, the participants were split into quartiles based on memory accuracy.
Average memory test accuracy by quartile and each quartile’s average post-test
Dunning-Kruger response is listed in Table 6.

Table 6. Average Recognition Memory Test Accuracy and Average Post-Test
and In-Test Dunning-Kruger Relative Response by Quartile
Average Post-Test
Average In-Test
Quartile
Accuracy
DK Relative
DK Relative
Response
Response
Top (N = 14)

.74 (.06)

3.50 (0.65)

3.26 (0.73)

3rd (N = 14)

.62 (.02)

3.29 (0.99)

3.33 (1.01)

2nd (N = 14)

.55 (.04)

2.79 (0.80)

2.79 (0.81)

Bottom (N = 14)

.38 (.08)

3.43 (0.51)

3.17 (0.62)

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

In order to be able to directly compare participants’ post-test relative
Dunning-Kruger estimate and their actual percentile, participants’ percentile
ranking made from their accuracy on the memory test was converted to the 5point scale of percentile estimates that were used both in-test during the retrieval
task and at the end of the experiment. A difference score for each participant’s
percentile ranking was calculated by subtracting their post-test relative DunningKruger estimate from their converted percentile ranking mentioned above. The
bottom quartile (M = 2.43, SD = 0.51, t(26) = 17.69, p < .001), 2nd quartile (M =

48

1.79, SD = 0.80, t(26) = 8.33, p < .001), and 3rd quartile (M = 1.43, SD = 1.28,
t(26) = 4.16, p < .001) significantly overestimated their percentile ranking while
the top quartile significantly underestimated their percentile ranking (M = -0.79,
SD = 0.89, t(26) = -3.29, p = .003) (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Average Difference Score by Quartile.
Difference score is calculated by subtracting the converted percentile ranking
from the estimated post-test relative score. The bars show the magnitude of
overestimation above the x-axis and underestimation below the x-axis for each of
the groups. The 2nd and 3rd quartile groups were combined because the groups
were not significantly different. Participants in the first quartile and the 2 nd & 3rd
quartile both overestimated their percentile significantly and were significantly
different from each other. Participants in the fourth quartile underestimated their
percentile significantly and were significantly different than the low percentile and
the 2nd & 3rd percentile. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, † = p < .10.
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However, a t-test revealed that the difference scores of the 2nd quartile
and the 3rd quartile were not significantly different, t(26) = 0.88, p = .39, and so
these were combined. The combined 2nd and 3rd quartile group was still
significantly overestimated their percentile ranking (M = 1.61, SD = 1.07, t(54) =
7.98, p < .001). On average, the difference score for the top quartile was
significantly different than the score for the bottom quartile (t(26) = 11.68, p
< .001) and the combined 2nd+3rd quartiles (t(340) = 7.22, p < .001). The
difference score for the bottom quartile was also significantly different than the
score for the 2nd and 3rd quartiles (t(38) = 2.93, p = .01).The magnitude of the
errors made by each group decreased as percentile increased: the bottom
quartile overestimated their percentile by 62.56%, the 2nd quartile overestimated
by 37.95%, the 3rd quartile overestimated by 14.56%, and the top quartile
underestimated by 8.30% (Figure 5). This basic finding provides evidence that
the DKE was elicited by our memory paradigm in a way that has not been shown
before to our knowledge. This result extends the DKE to episodic memory.
In order to better investigate differences in cognitive strategies,
participants were separated into groups based on estimation accuracy instead of
percentile ranking based upon their post-test estimates of their relative
performance on the memory test.1

1

We used the post-test relative Dunning-Kruger estimate to create groups of over-estimators (N =
38), correct-estimators (N = 8), and under-estimators (N = 10), although we also conducted a
paired t-test between the average of the in-test Dunning-Kruger responses (M = 3.14, SD = 0.81)
for each person to the post-test relative Dunning-Kruger response (M = 3.16, SD = 0.78) and
found that the two scores did not differ, t(55) = 1.30, p = .20, justifying the decision to use the
post-test relative Dunning-Kruger response to separate our groups.
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Response Speeds for Dunning-Kruger Judgments
Differences in reaction times for each Dunning-Kruger response were also
analyzed, using a t-test between groups. There were no significant differences in
reaction times collapsed across all Dunning-Kruger responses between the three
estimator groups (over-estimators vs under-estimators: t(44) = 0.17, p = .87,
over-estimators vs correct-estimator: t(42) = -0.81, p = .42, under-estimators vs
correct-estimators: t(16) = -0.76, p = .46).
Reaction times were then analyzed by response number to investigate
any differences in specific responses. Over-estimators’ reaction times when
rating themselves in the 90th percentile or above (response of ‘5’, N = 13) were
found to be significantly faster (M = 1656 ms, SD = 544 ms) than underestimators’ reaction times (M = 2578 ms, SD = 827 ms) of the same judgement,
t(14) = -2.43, p = .03 (Figure 7). That is, people who over-estimated their abilities
were also responding faster when they believed they were doing the best, as
opposed to the slower responding of people who were under-estimating their
abilities.
Our sample size for the under-estimator group contained only three
people, and though the current paradigm has been previously established as
being sensitive to small sample sizes of three for memory and EEG related
effects (Addante et al, 2012; Addante, 2015) we still wanted to be conscientious
of possible issues related to small sample sizes in the DKE measure. Therefore,
we also collapsed that group with the additional group of correct-estimators (N =
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2) to create a more generic larger group (N=5). Over-estimators were still
significantly faster than our collapsed generic group (M = 2457 ms, SD = 634 ms;
t(18) = -2.56, p = .02) when responding that they thought they were doing the
best (i.e. in the 90th percentile or above). The reaction times for over-estimators
(N = 10) when rating themselves less than the 60th percentile (response ‘1’; M =
2204 ms, SD = 628 ms) were significantly slower than when over-estimators
rated themselves in 90th percentile or above (DK response of ‘5’; M = 1656 ms,
SD = 544 ms, N = 13), t(21) = 2.24, p = .04.
We next conducted a t-test between over-estimators (M = 2178 ms, SD =
602 ms, N = 11) and the combined group of correct- and under-estimators (M =
1604 ms, SD = 330 ms, N = 3) rating themselves in the 59th percentile or lower
but there were no significant differences between their reaction times, t(12) =
1.56, p = .15, very possibly due to low sample size. Every other comparison of
reaction times for responses of ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’, and ‘5’ were not significantly
different between under-estimators and over-estimators (Table 7 for data).
One other effect involving reaction time emerged that was marginally
significant based upon standard thresholds. The combined group of correct +
under-estimators exhibited reaction times with the opposite pattern showing a
slower average response time when rating themselves in the 90th percentile or
above (M = 2457 ms, SD = 634 ms, N = 5) and a faster mean reaction time when
rating themselves less than the 60th percentile (M = 1604 ms, SD = 329 ms, N =
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3; t(6) = -2.12, p = .08). These marginal effects may be due to the low sample
size in these groups (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Mean Reaction Times of High and Low Percentile Estimation by
Dunning-Kruger Groups.
Performing in the 59th percentile or below corresponds to response 1 on the task
and performing in the 90th percentile or above corresponds to response 5. The
reaction times are separated by over-estimators and the combined group of
correct- and under-estimators. Mean reaction times are reported in ms. * = p
< .05., † = p < .10.
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Table 7. Response Distribution Proportions of Dunning-Kruger
Responses and Mean Reaction Times, Standard Deviations, and
Sample Size for In-Test Dunning-Kruger Judgments by Estimator
Group
Group

Over-Estimators
(n = 36)

Dunning-Kruger

1

2

3

4

5

.05

.19

.39

.28

.09

Reaction Time

2204

2064

1948

2044

1656

SD

628

641

644

860

544

N per Response

10

23

33

27

13

.09

.28

.33

.25

.05

Judgments
Response
Distribution

Correct-

Response

Estimators

Distribution

(n = 8)

Reaction Time

1447

2323

2018

1920

2275

SD

263

987

890

733

360

N per Response

2

6

7

5

2

.01

.21

.35

.38

.05

Under-

Response

Estimators

Distribution

(n = 10)

Reaction Time

1918

2074

2166

1996

2579

SD

--

1249

543

770

478

N per Response

1

5

9

9

3

.04

.24

.34

.32

.05

Reaction Time

1604

2209

2101

1969

2457

SD

330

1062

693

729

635

N per Response

3

11

16

14

5

Combined
Correct- and

Response

Under-

Distribution

Estimators
(n = 18)

Note. Means and SD are in milliseconds.
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Electrophysiological Results
Recognition Memory
Recognition memory was analyzed by comparing the physiology of ERPs
for correctly identified old items (hits: responses of ‘4’ and ‘5’) to correctly
identified new items (correct rejections: responses of ‘1’ and ‘2’). The scalp
topographic maps for the item recognition difference wave (Hits - Correct
Rejections) for every 200 ms are shown in Figure 8. A central positive effect
(shown by warmers colors on the map) is evident beginning at 400-600ms. To
establish the consistency of the current study’s effects with those of prior studies
using the same memory paradigm, we analyzed this FN400 effect at the same
Cz site as reported in Addante et al. (2012a); it was found to be a reliable effect
at Cz (t(54) = 3.80, p < .001) but was also significant at several adjacent
electrode sites, such as Pz (t(54) = 3.41, p = .001).
Consistent with prior findings on ERPs of recognition memory, this FN400
effect was then found to then shift towards the left parietal region during later
latencies of 600-800ms, exhibiting maximal effects at the same left parietal site of
CP5 reported in Addante et al., (2012a) (i.e. demonstrating the LPC effect, for
reviews see Rugg & Curran, 2007; Friedman, 2013).
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Figure 8. Event-Related Potentials for Recognition Memory.
a) Topographic maps of hits compared to correct rejections for every 200 ms
interval. b) Cz shows an FN400 from 400ms to 600ms. c) CP5 shows an LPC
from 600ms to 800ms, consistent with replicating prior findings in this memory
paradigm (Addante et al., 2012a, 2012b). Mean ERP amplitudes for hits
compared to correct rejection from d) 400-600 ms and e) 600-800ms. Compare
to Addante et al., (2012), Neuroimage. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

To assess the consistency with and replicability of similar
neuropsychological findings reported of small samples (N = 3 and N = 6) while
with the same paradigm (Addante et al., 2012b) we also compared item hits that
were successfully recognized with low confidence (item response of ‘4’; M = -
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5.13, SD = 0.66) to those hits that were recognized with high confidence
(response ‘5’; M = -4.28, SD = 0.64). This revealed the same pattern of FN400
effects at mid-frontal sites (Fc1) from 400-600 ms (t(34) = 2.69, p = .01) and LPC
effects at left parietal site (P3) from 600-900ms as was reported among
hippocampal amnesia patients and controls by Addante et al., (2012b) t(34) =
3.21, p = .003 (low confidence hits: M = 0.59, SD = 0.48; high confidence hits: M
= -0.41, SD = 0.42; Figure 9).

Figure 9. Event-Related Potentials for High Confidence Recognition and Low
Confidence Recognition.
Topographic maps of high confidence item hits compared to low confidence item
hits from a) 400-600 ms and b) 600-800 ms. Maps are range normalized with
warmer colors indicating more positive differences in voltage. ERPs of high and
low confidence recognition items at electrode sites c) FC1 and d) P3. The
dashed box indicates latencies that represent significant differences in ERP
amplitude. Mean ERP amplitude differences are shown at electrode site e) FC1
from 400-600 ms and f) P3 from 600-900ms. Compare to prior findings of
Addante, et al., (2012), Neuropsychologia. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Source Memory
ERPs for source memory were analyzed by comparing judgments of both
correct and incorrect source memory responses as compared to correct
rejections. For source correct judgments, an FN400 effect was evident from 400600 ms at Cz, again replicating findings from prior studies (Addante et al., 2012),
t(54) = 3.97, p < .001. During later latencies of 600-800 ms, correct source
judgments elicited the canonical LPC effect of recollection (Addante et al.,
2012a,b, Rugg & Curran, 2007) maximal over left parietal site CP5, t(54) = 4.05,
p < .001. For source incorrect judgements, an FN400 effect was evident from
400-600 ms at fronto-central site of Cz (t(54) = 2.85, p = .01), but there was no
evidence of a reliable LPC effect at left parietal site of CP5 during the later
latencies of 600-800 ms, as the source incorrect ERPs were not significantly
different than correct rejections (t(54) = 1.98, p = .053) (Figure 10).
The prior analyses established the viability for the current paradigm in
successfully eliciting the standard, canonical ERP effects of familiarity and
recollection (the FN400, and LPC, respectively), but because our goal of
assessing ERPs for the Dunning Kruger Effect will require assessing effects that
are non-traditional and otherwise relatively novel and unexplored, we also
wanted to first establish that the current paradigm would be an effective platform
from which to detect those kinds of effects.
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Figure 10. Event-Related Potentials for Source Memory.
ERPs of source correct judgements and source incorrect judgements compared
to correct rejections at electrode site a) Cz and b) CP5. Bar graphs show the
mean ERP amplitudes of source memory judgments for c) site Cz from 400-600
ms and for d) site CP5 from 600-800ms. Compare to Addante et al., (2012),
Neuroimage. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

For this reason, we also assessed the extent to which we could identify
relatively novel ERP effects that were not the traditional ones for a memory task,
and hence we analyzed a rare memory condition referred to as ‘context
familiarity’, which has been reported earlier by Addante et al (2012a) for
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combinations of item+source memory responses that varied for high and low item
confidence while holding source memory accuracy constant.
We assessed these conditions as compared to correct rejections, from
400-600ms for item familiarity, from 600-800ms at Cp5 for recollection, and from
800-1000ms at left frontal for context familiarity, as reported previously by
Addante et al., (2012a). First, we replicated that high confidence item hits with
correct source memory did elicit an LPC at a-priori electrode sites CP5, t(17) =
2.40, p = .03, and post-hoc visual inspection of the data revealed that these
differences were evident maximally at P4, t(17) = 3.32, p = .004. Next, we found
evidence of a significant negative-going effect from 800-1000 ms at left frontal
and frontal-central electrode sites that had been previously reported by Addante
et al. (2012a) for context familiarity processing, thereby replicating those findings
with a larger sample size in the current study. This effect was maximal at leftfrontal site F7, t(17) = -2.36, p = .03, and marginally significant at adjacent sites
(Fc1, Fc5, and C3; representative site of Fc1: t(17) = -2.08, p = .053 (Figure 11)2.
These results converge to replicate prior finding and give credence to the current
paradigm’s ability to detect reliable ERPs effects for novel cognitive processes.

2

Similar to Addante et al (2012a), low confidence hits with correct source
memory judgments did not exhibit an FN400 for item familiarity at any electrode
site from 400-600 ms, nor exhibit any evidence of an LPC for recollection-related
processing at CP5 from 600-800 ms, t(17) = 0.09, p = .93.
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Figure 11. Event-Related Potentials for Contextual Familiarity.
Topographic maps show a) high confidence item recognition with low confidence
source judgments (Item 5 + Source 4) compared to correct rejections from 600800 ms and b) low confidence item recognition with low confidence source
judgments compared to correct rejections from 800-1000 ms. The black dot in
panel a indicates site P3 while the black dot in panel b indicates site FC1. c)
ERPs show that an LPC effect is evident for Item 5 + Source 4 but not for Item 4
+ Source 4 at CP5 from 600-800 ms. d) ERPs show that a negative-going effect
is evident at FC1 from 800-1000 ms. The dashed box indicates the latencies of
the ERP that represent statistically significant effects. The cross indicates
latencies that are marginally significant. Compare to Addante et al., (2012),
Neuroimage. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, † = p < .10.

Dunning-Kruger Effect
Because investigation into the electrophysiology of the DKE is novel and
exploratory, the data were analyzed in several ways to probe several possible
differences between judgements and cognitive strategies. First, we assessed for
general differences that could be identified between the tasks of memory and
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metacognition. To do this, we compared the ERPs for all memory judgements
collapsed together and compared that to ERPs for decisions in all of the
Dunning-Kruger related judgments (Figure 12).

Figure 12. Comparison of Event-Related Potentials for Memory Judgments and
Metacognitive Judgments Estimating Performance.
a) Topographic maps of ERPs for all memory judgments compared to all
Dunning-Kruger judgments. Each topographic map is range normalized
according to their mean latencies. Warmer colors represent more positive-going
voltage differences. b) ERPs for memory and metacognition tasks at central
parietal site Pz. c) ERPs for memory and metacognition tasks at mid-frontal site
Fz. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

This comparison revealed that activity for the metacognitive DKE
decisions was significantly greater than those for memory judgements, starting
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from approximately 300 ms and continuing through 1000 ms at almost every
electrode site. These effects were maximal at the central parietal site of Pz
through 800ms (300-500 ms: t(54) = 10.69, p < .001; 400-600 ms: t(54) = 15.19,
p < .001; 600-900 ms: t(54) = 9.79, p < .001.), upon which time the effects
became evident as maximal at mid-frontal site Fz from 900-1200 ms (t(54) =
6.46, p < .001). This comparison was further examined by estimator group but no
significant differences were found.
Are there differences in how different DKE groups were making their
memory judgements? We next investigated physiological differences in memory
as a function of the different DK groups (over-estimators, under-estimators,
correct-estimators). Memory-related ERP effects (hits minus correct rejections,
Figure 8 above) were analyzed as a function of DK group. At the 600 ms to 900
ms latency that characterizes the LPC of recollection-related memory processing,
five electrodes in the left parietal region (CP5, CP1, Pz, P3, and P7: P3 is
reported as a representative electrode) had a significantly higher amplitude for
the under-estimator group (M = 1.96, SD = 1.35) than the over-estimator group
(M = 0.30, SD = 1.72), t(44)= 2.81; p = .01 (Figure 13).
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Figure 13. Difference Waves of Recognition Memory Event-Related Potential
Effects for Dunning-Kruger Groups.
Difference waves for memory effects (hits - correct rejections, e.g. Figure 7) for
Dunning-Kruger groups of Over- and Under-Estimators at electrode a) Pz and d)
P3. The dashed box indicates the latency that represents statistically significant
effects. Topographic maps show differences in memory effects at a) Pz from
400-600 ms and e) P3 from 600-900 ms. Each topographic map is range
normalized according to their mean latencies. Warmer colors represent more
positive-going voltage differences. Bar graphs show significant differences in
mean ERP amplitude c) Pz from 400-600 ms and f) P3 from 600-900 ms. * p
< .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.

This finding suggests that the under-estimator group, which consists of the
highest performing individuals, relied on using more recollection than the overestimator group in making memory judgments. Since the over-estimators
constituted the lowest performing individuals, it is possible that one reason why
they performed lower was because of lacking in recollection of those particular
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trials. We also found that under-estimators had a significantly higher amplitude
(M = 1.39, SD = 1.59) than over-estimators (M = 0.25, SD = 1.38) maximally at
Pz, t(44)= 2.24; p = .03, but also significant at P3, t(44)= 2.18; p = .03, from
400ms to 600ms. The difference was evident in the parietal region instead of the
expected left frontal region characteristic of the FN400 (Figure 13).
Next, we investigated differences in physiology for the respective DK
metacognitive judgments estimating how one thought they were doing on the
task (this comparison is with the total group, not split by estimator group). ERPs
of self-estimates in the 69th percentile or less (responses of ‘1’ and ‘2’) were
collapsed together as a general metric of low self-estimates and were found to be
significantly different than the high self-estimate category that ranged from selfestimates in the 80th percentile or above (responses of ‘4’ and ‘5’), maximally
over electrode F8 from 600-900 ms, t(32) = -2.97, p = .006, but also significant at
several adjacent electrode sites such as F4, t(32) = -2.54, p = .02.
We probed the effect further to investigate the contributions of particular
responses. We could not compare the highest self-estimates (judgments of ‘5’) to
the lowest self-estimates (judgments of ‘1’) due to low sample size in both
categories (N = 3 for responses of ‘1’, N = 2 for responses of ‘5’). Thus, we
compared 80-89th percentile self-estimates (judgments of ‘4’, N = 19) to 60-69th
percentile judgments (judgments of ‘2’, N = 10) and found that the significant
difference persisted maximally over the right frontal electrode F8, t(27) = -3.02, p
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= .01, but was also significant at several frontal sites such as F4, t(27) = -2.59, p
= .02 (Figure 14). These effects did not differ when analyzed by estimator group.

Figure 14. Event-Related Potentials Comparing High and Low Dunning-Kruger
Self-Estimates.
a) Topographic maps of Dunning-Kruger responses of ‘5’ and ‘4’ for all subjects
compared to Dunning-Kruger responses of ‘1’ and ‘2’ and b) Dunning-Kruger
response of ‘4’ compared to Dunning-Kruger responses of ‘2’ separately at 600900 ms. The black dot identifies electrode site F4 (where ERPs shown in panel b
represent). c) and d) ERPs corresponding to each of the topographic maps are
displayed directly to the right of their respective topography maps. The dashed
box indicates the latency of the topographic map that represents statistically
significant effects. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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How do metacognitive judgments differ among good and bad, over- and
under- estimators? To investigate this question, we analyzed group level
differences in ERPs between the over-, correct-, and under-estimators by DKE
response (all responses collapsed together). There were significant differences in
ERP amplitude between the under-estimators and over-estimators at left-frontal
electrode F3 from 150-250 ms (MOver-Estimators = 5.09, SD = 3.08; MUnder-Estimators =
2.93, SD = 2.18; t(44) = -2.07, p = .04) and at mid-frontal electrode Fz from 400600 ms (MOver-Estimators = 4.16, SD = 5.09; MUnder-Estimators = 0.55, SD = 4.40; t(44) =
-2.03, p = .048), such that ERPs for over-estimators/under-performers were far
more positive than that of the under-estimators/over-performers. Mean ERP
amplitude was also significantly different between Correct-Estimators (M = -1.30,
SD = 2.92) and Under-Estimators (M = 1.64, SD = 2.33) at central electrode Cz
from 800-1200 ms, t(16) = 2.38, p = .03.
This frontal effect at 400-600 ms may be characteristic of the FN400 ERP
effect related to familiarity-based processing, in that over-estimators may be
under-performing because they are relying on the less-specific memory process
of familiarity to make their metacognitive judgments reflecting upon their past
performance, instead of the recollection-related processes that appear to be
supporting those who were found to be over-performing/under-estimating (Figure
15).
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Figure 15. Event-Related Potentials of Collapsed Dunning-Kruger Responses by
Dunning-Kruger Group.
Topographic maps show ERPs of collapsed Dunning-Kruger responses
(Dunning-Kruger judgments 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 combined) for Over-Estimators
compared to Under-Estimators from a) 150-250 ms and b) 400-600 ms and c) for
Correct-Estimators compared to Under-Estimators from 800-1200 ms. Each
topographic map is range normalized according to their mean latencies. Warmer
colors represent more positive-going voltage differences. d), e), and f) show
ERPs corresponding to each topographic map to left. g), h), and i) show bar
graphs displaying the mean ERP amplitudes corresponding to each ERP and
topographic map on the left. The dashed line indicates the time differences that
ERPs are significantly different between the groups compared. * p < .05, ** p
< .01, *** p < .001.
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CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION

Recognition and Source Memory Results
The primary goal of this experiment was to investigate the physiology of
the DKE by using EEG to record brain activity during self-estimates of
performance in an episodic memory task. However, to help establish the
reliability of our physiological effects for the DKE (which is rather new and
exploratory), it was important to show that our behavioral and physiological
findings for memory were consistent with past research. We first review the
results of the current study for measures of episodic memory, and then review
the results for the Dunning-Kruger judgments.
By using a well-established memory paradigm (Addante et al, 2011,
2012a, 2012b; Addante, 2015; Roberts et al., 2018), we were able to replicate
several memory effects in the literature. We first identified basic memory effects
ubiquitous in the literature that old items are remembered better and responded
to faster than new items (Tables 1 and 2), and that ERPs for these items were
associated with the canonical effects of the FN400 and LPC that are traditionally
viewed as the putative neural correlates of familiarity- and recollection-based
memory processing (Figures 8 and 9) (e.g. Addante et al., 2012b; for reviews see
Sanquist, 1980; Curran, 2000; Rugg & Curran, 2007; Friedman, 2013). We also
identified behavioral and physiological effects for source memory, revealing that
an FN400 effect was evident for both conditions of source correct and source
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incorrect trials, but that the LPC was evident only for the source correct trials
(Figure 10) consistent with earlier findings from this paradigm (Addante et al.,
2012a, b) and also consistent with theoretical models positing recollection and
familiarity as dual processes of episodic memory (Yonelinas, 1999; 2002;
Yonelinas et al., 2004; 2010).
The current study was also able to extend several recently-reported ERP
effects of memory that have remained relatively unexplored in the field, and
hence benefiting replication and extension in order to further understand these
phenomena. In particular, Addante et al. (2012a) reported a novel late frontparietal ERP effects described as “context familiarity” for instances in which
participants provided low-confidence item memory hits that still had accurate
source memory judgments for their studied task’s context. Our results replicated
these findings, and did so with a larger sample size, in a different laboratory, and
using a different subject population (Figure 10). The current study extended
those physiological findings by also reporting behavioral measures of reaction
times for the conditions of context familiarity, and contrasted that with
recollection-related responses. This revealed reliable differences in how subjects
were responding in these instances: participants responded faster to the high
confidence recognized items than low confidence recognized items (Figure 4).
This extends the ERP findings by demonstrating that they are not epiphenomenal
and reflecting distinct cognitive processes retrieving memories of context that are
independent of those with recollection (Addante et al., 2012a).
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Together, these ERP and behavioral results replicating traditional
memory-related effects in the data provide convergent evidence that our study
was effective at eliciting the neural-correlates of memory processes such as
recollection and familiarity. More importantly, they establish that our dataset can
be used for novel explorations into metacognition-related physiology for which
there is a much sparser ERP literature from which to draw comparisons. These
findings give us confidence that the data set is reasonably uncontaminated by
artifacts (such as blinking, eye saccades, and muscle activity), and is otherwise
acceptable for further exploration in new domains.

The Dunning-Kruger Effect
Dunning-Kruger Behavioral Results
To assess the DKE, we first sought to establish the viability of the adapted
episodic memory paradigm for eliciting the canonical Dunning-Kruger pattern of
results, which is a necessary and critical step. To our knowledge, the DKE has
not been previously explored in episodic memory tasks, nor in other tasks using
repeated self-estimate trials rather than a one-time post-test self-estimate (e.g.
Dunning & Kruger, 1999). Our task employed Dunning-Kruger estimates
interspersed throughout an on-going episodic memory test, which was an
innovation in integrating these methodologies into behavioral tasks. The current
study’s paradigm also permitted the collection of reaction times for Dunning-
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Kruger judgments that could be analyzed at a group level, which prior studies of
the DKE had not been able to investigate due to their use of one-time measures.
The results from our behavioral measures revealed that the memory
paradigm was indeed successful at eliciting the DKE. Participants were
separated into quartiles and their actual percentile ranking in the group was
plotted alongside their estimated percentile ranking (Figure 5). The lowest
performing participants in the bottom quartile were found to have drastically
overestimated how highly they ranked in their groups while the highest
performing participants underestimated their actual ranking. This basic finding
was important to identify, and its establishment permitted us to continue to
explore the data in more specific ways in both behavioral and
electrophysiological domains.
For measures of reaction time, over-estimators were discernably faster
than under-estimators in judging themselves to be in the top percentile, but they
were slower to judge themselves as being in the bottom percentile. There are
three theoretical accounts that can be used to explain the reaction times for
under- and over-estimators: cognition, social interactions, and the traditional
Dunning-Kruger account of double ignorance (1999).
The first account uses cognition for prototypes to explain the reaction time
patterns. Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) results suggest that over-estimators do
not understand that they are performing poorly and so they believe they are
performing well and placing well within their participant group. This could lead to
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them having a very positive perception about their ability to perform well on
certain types of tasks. Research on prototypes has shown that answers to
questions that are very obviously true (closest to one’s prototype) are answered
faster (for example, the question, “Is a robin a bird?” will elicit a faster “yes”
response than the questions “Is an ostrich a bird?” even though both are true)
(Rosch, 1974; Collins & Quillian, 1969). Therefore, if a person’s perception of
oneself (or prototype of themselves) includes that they perform well on tasks,
they will be more likely to give a fast response when rating themselves well as
opposed to rating themselves poorly. On the other hand, if they believe they are
performing poorly, this perception would oppose the prototype that they have
formed causing them to react slower to rating their performance negatively. The
same may be true If under-estimators have formed a perception about
themselves that they are only average or even below average. It would then be
logical that they would be slow to rate themselves as being the best and quick to
rate themselves as being less than the best.
The second account by which the current findings for DKE reaction times
could be viewed is the need to belong theory proposed by Baumeister and Leary
(1995). The need to belong theory states that individuals have a need to form
social attachments with other individuals and without such attachments, physical
and/or mental consequences will ensue. The reaction time patterns found can be
explained in this framework of desiring to maintain social attachments by being
able to relate to others. Under-estimators are the individuals who perform better
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than average; therefore, if they feel they are performing less than average, they
may be faster to respond to attempt to prove they are like the in-group. However,
if they are performing well, they may respond slower to rating themselves in the
top percentile for fear of being ostracized. Over-estimators may have the same
mentality. They are the individuals who perform less than average and if they feel
they are performing better than average, will respond faster to be accepted by
the group and seen as smart. Otherwise, if they feel they are not performing well,
they may be slower to respond for fear of being disliked because of their low
performance.
The third account that the reaction time results can also be explained is by
using Kruger and Dunning’s (1999) model of double ignorance of low performers
(i.e. 1. They do not know the answer, 2. They do not know they are ignorant of
the answer) together with the inability of high performers to estimate their place
among their peers due to not realizing the weaknesses of their peer group. By
this account, over-estimators would be fast to report that they are doing well
because they believe they are actually doing well, while they are slow to report
that they are performing poorly because they do not believe they usually perform
poorly or do not want to admit to themselves that they are performing poorly.
Dunning-Kruger Physiology
We began exploring the neurophysiology of the DKE by examining brain
activity for general differences in processing between the memory and
metacognition tasks; that is, assessing the extent to which these two judgment
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types could be established as reflecting different kinds of processing. We
assessed ERPs between all memory trials versus all self-estimates, and they
were found to be different beginning from approximately 300 ms into the epoch
and continuing throughout the epoch to 1200 ms at almost every electrode site,
but being maximal first at posterior parietal sites and then later at mid-frontal
regions (Figure 12). This indicated that subjects were processing the
metacognitive judgments of the DKE in substantively different ways than a
baseline condition of memory-based stimulus processing, and revealed that our
paradigm could reliably detect these differences with the available trial counts of
DK judgments and the precision of the ERPs.
The pattern of the ERPs (Figure 12) indicated that the large centro-parietal
and mid-frontal effects, respectively, were reflecting patterns consistent with
established properties of the P300 ERP effect, or P3a and P3b effects, that are
known to have the same distributions of topography and latency, and which have
been well-established as being associated with novelty processing (Dien,
Spencer, & Donchin, 2003; Otten & Donchin, 2000; Simons, Graham, Miles, &
Chen, 2001). This is consistent with the paradigm in that the DKE judgments
were uncommon trials that appeared among the common memory trials in the
test, and would have been salient stimuli for eliciting an orienting effect of
attention as a novelty item (Kishiyama, Yonelinas, & Lazzara, 2006; Knight,
1996; Knight & Scabini, 1998).
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Having established that the paradigm had sufficient signal-to-noise
sensitivity for successfully identifying the physiology associated with DKE
judgments, we next explored whether these different metacognitive judgments
were associated with differential ERP patterns. When brain activity of all
Dunning-Kruger responses were investigated together, over-estimators were
found to have a higher mean ERP amplitude than under-estimators at frontal
electrode sites during 400-600 ms (Figure 15). ERP effects varied as a function
of whether people were performing well or performing poorly, suggesting that
these ‘perceptions of grandeur’ may be caused by an over-reliance on a sense of
familiarity, as opposed to recollecting the clear details of their past encounters
from which to guide the proper placement of the perceptual judgments. Underestimators, on the other hand, exhibited a larger LPC than over-estimators did
from 600-900ms during memory judgments (hits to correct rejections; Figure 13),
indicating that these humble under-estimators may be estimating their
performance by reliance upon the clearer details of recollected information, as
opposed to the fuzzy sense of familiarity that can come with less accuracy
(Yonelinas et al., 2004; 2010).
Implications
This experiment had several novel contributions to the understanding of
the DKE. First, this is the only Dunning-Kruger experiment, to our knowledge, in
which self-estimates relative to a peer group were recorded repeatedly
throughout the task. That is, normally, self-estimates in prior studies are only
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acquired once: at the end of the task (Adams & Adams, 1960; Burson, Larrick, &
Klayman, 2006; Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003; Kruger & Dunning, 1999; Oskamp,
1965; Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2017; Ryvkin, Krajč, & Ortmann,
2012a; Sanchez & Dunning, 2018) although there was a variation of the task
using repeated estimates before the task itself (Simons, 2013). This novel
adjustment to the classic Dunning-Kruger paradigm was critical to collecting both
reaction time measures and brain activity during the metacognitive selfestimates.
Our finding that under-estimators had a larger LPC than over-estimators is
a novel finding and gives some insight into the inaccurate estimates that occur in
over-estimators. Because the over-estimators (under-performers) had a smaller
LPC, this finding suggests that they used less recollection during episodic
memory retrieval. It is then logical to suggest that their memories for episodic
events were diminished as well, leading to more inaccuracies when trying to
recall episodic events related to their performance.
We also found evidence of differences in brain activity between underestimators and over-estimators when collapsing brain activity for all DunningKruger metacognitive responses. Over-estimators had a larger ERP mean
amplitude than under-estimators at mid-frontal electrode sites from 400-600ms,
which is the characteristic position and latency of the FN400 that has been
synonymous with familiarity in many prior studies (Addante et al., 2012; Curran,
2000; Friedman, 2013; Gherman & Philiastides, 2015; Rugg et al., 1998; Rugg &
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Curran, 2007). In the framework of a memory-related interpretation of these
results, one could argue that because we found an FN400 in this condition, overestimators may have relied more upon familiarity than under-estimators in
making these judgments, in lieu of the recollections that under-estimators were
evidently relying upon instead. That is, each group was arriving at fundamentally
different metacognitive conclusions because they were relying upon, or being
influenced by, fundamentally different neurocognitive processes of memory.
Limitations and Considerations for Future Research
Interpreting ERP findings of FN400 and LPC effects should always be
doen with caution, relative to experimental conditions and inherent constraints
(Paller, Lucas, & Voss., 2012; Voss, Lucas, & Paller, 2012); this remains true
when interpreting ERPs associated with Dunning-Kruger judgments. An
important consideration is to avoid an over-reliance on reverse inference, since
effects like the FN400 have also been characterized as including contributions of
other cognitive processes such as implicit fluency and conceptual priming (Voss
& Paller, 2010, 2012; Leynes & Zish, 2012; Leynes & Addante, 2016). For these
and other reasons, we believe that the current work, while provocative, is best
viewed as motivating future research that can further investigate these effects,
extend them, and test them against competing hypotheses.
There were some limitations in the design of the current study that could
be addressed in future research. The scale that was used to report percentile
self-estimates was limited to five button presses. The reason why the Dunning-
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Kruger estimates used a five-point scale was because we sought to keep
response options easy for participants using the same 5-point scale in the
memory judgments. However, that meant that the lowest participants could
indicate their percentile ranking was 59th percent and below which is more than
half of the scale. Previous research on the better-than-average effect (Alicke &
Govorun, 2005; Brown, 2012) has shown that participants are motivated to rate
themselves more highly than other individuals, especially on important matters.
Therefore, this effect gives support to the validity of our scale but we recognize
that a considerable amount of sensitivity is lost due to this adapted scale.
In addition, anchoring effects may have played a role in determining which
buttons participants pressed. Anchoring effects occur when answers remain
close to offered information and correct answers are not searched for when far
away from initially offered choices (Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974). Though it would be impractical to expect naturalistic subjects
to necessarily have an equal distribution of honest responses across our scale,
participants pressed ‘1’ and ‘5’ much less often than ‘2’, ‘3’, or ‘4. This may have
been due to anchoring effects because participants were told to fixate on the
middle of the screen to avoid eye movements and the response of ‘3’ was shown
in the middle of the screen. Therefore, participants may have anchored onto ‘3’
which could explain why it was the most chosen response.
One way to address both of these issues in future research is to have
participants speak their estimated percentile ranking using a digital microphone,

79

(i.e.: the SV-1 Voice Key https://www.cedrus.com/sv1/), that is engineered to
record precise reaction times by logging when a sound above a certain threshold
is reached. Our lab has recently developed procedures for doing this in ERP
studies of cued-recall in episodic memory (Sirianni & Addante, 2019; manuscript
in preparation). In future work utilizing such designs, participants could be given
a prompt on the screen to speak their estimated percentile ranking on a scale of
0 to 99, which would provide a more sensitive scale and possibly even better
resolution of DKE estimates than our current Likert scale options much the way
that improved resolution measures have revealed insightful advances in
understanding working memory (Koen, et. al., 2017; Kolarik, et al., 2017;
Yonelinas, 2013; Zhang & Luck, 2008, 2015).
Summary and Conclusions
By establishing that we can extend the DKE to studies of episodic
memory, in which we can measure both response speeds and physiology
occurring over multiple samples, we were able to identify physiological correlates
that distinguished Dunning-Kruger responding. These findings of differing
physiology between under- and over-estimators have large implications for the
field of social cognition. By investigating the underlying neural correlates of this
effect, we can begin to categorize exactly why or how such illusory errors of
metacognition are occurring. Our finding that over-estimators (under-performers)
have a smaller LPC related to recollection-based processing introduces the
possibility of developing countermeasures to improve their memory (such as
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entrainment devices known to improve memory in our paradigm (Roberts et al.,
2018)) or non-invasive brain stimulation such as transcranial direct current
stimulation (tDCS) and investigate if their self-estimates improve in accuracy with
better memory (Boudewyn, Roberts, Mizrak, Ranganath, & Carter, 2018;
Cappiello, Xie, David, Bikson, & Zhang, 2016; Mizrak et al., 2018). More
experimentation is needed to assess exactly what cognitive processes are being
employed, but the present work may constitute an important first step in
identifying them.
The current study thus represents a step forward in understanding one of
the most pervasive observations about human behavior: persistent metacognitive
illusions that cause us to both over-estimate and under-estimate our
performances. Those who tend to perform best often under-estimate, whereas
those who perform worst tend to over-estimate the most. This pernicious pattern
has been observed by thinkers from Aristotle to Confucius and throughout the
modern age. The basic premise of the DKE - that we have inherent illusions of
metacognition and self-assessment- is thus a fundamental force that shapes our
psychological universe in much the way that gravity is a fundamental force that
shapes our physical universe. As gravity works to shape our physical world, our
abilities to make metacognitive assessments of ourselves can likewise be seen
as one of the parallel natural forces at work in shaping our own psychological
universe. The effect is timeless, discriminates upon no one, and affects everyone
at some point, large or small. Overcoming these psychological errors is possible,
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but like overcoming gravity, it takes energy, resources, and concerted effort, and
then persists only for transient moments in time until returning back to baseline
levels.
In conclusion, empirical investigations into the DKE have to date been
limited to behavioral measures of simple tasks that collected only one
metacognitive judgment per task, and that lacked any physiological measures of
the neurocognitive processes underlying this phenomenon. The current study
adds to the literature in several ways: First, it represents the first known
physiological recordings of the DKE. Second, this was made possible by using
an integrative new paradigm that permitted multiple recurring trials of DunningKruger metacognitive judgments. Third, this paradigmatic innovation made it
possible to capture the DKE in a complex episodic memory task which extends
the body of work on the DKE from logic and math problems used in prior studies.
Fourth, the current study also contributed the first known behavioral data
measuring reaction times for these metacognitive decisions, providing revealing
insight into why people differ in this phenomenon. We hope that this work can
inspire new explorations to discover the neural correlates of our psychological
processes, with the overarching goal of better understanding human behavior
and cognition.
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APPENDIX A
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
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